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I 
Van Cleve argues, inter alia, that Castaneda's 
guise theory, 1 because of its bundle-theoretic charac-
ter, suffers from some of the old problems that tend to 
afflict bundle ontologies. I intend to show that guise 
theory meets all of Van Cleve*s challenges. This will 
suggest that guise theory offers all the advantages of 
a bundle theory, without its traditional flaws. 
II 
Van Cleve (1985) considers the following three ver-
sions of the bundle theory: 1 
(BT1) (i) . . . a thing is a complex entity of 
which properties are the sole constituents, and 
(ii) . . . for a thing to have or exemplify a 
property is for that property to be a constituent 
of it.' 
(BT2) A thing is nothing . . . but a bundle of 
properties . . . whose elements all stand to one 
another in a certain important relation . . . 
(i.e.) co-instantiation* . . . The cardinal point 
about co-instantiation is that it is a contingent 
relation. That is, if two or more properties are 
co-instantiated, it is not in general necessary 
that this have been so.* 
(BT3) this version would decline to identify in-
dividuals with complexes of properties, offering 
instead to translate any statement about individ-
uals into a statement exclusively about proper-
ties.* 
(BT1) and (BT2) are attacked on the basis of six 
traditional objections that are usually voiced against 
bundle theories. The first three really have to do 
with taking the crucial notion of bundle (or complex of 
properties) to be nothing (or little) more than the no-
tion of set. I shall rehearse just one of them. In 
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the words of Van Cleve: "there are many sets without 
corresponding things, e.g. the set being an alligator, 
being purple." 7 
Van Cleve holds that this kind of objection is fa-
tal to (BT1) but he admits that (BT2) gets around them. 
He concedes, however, that (BT2) must surrender to the 
remaining three. I summarize them* as follows: 
Objection 4. (BT2) cannot account for the fact that 
things undergo changes. 
Objection 5. It follows from (BT2) that all things 
have all their properties essentially. 
Objection 6. (BT2) requires that the principle of the 
identity of indiscernibles (PII) is a necessary truth, 
but exceptions to PII are conceivable. 
Van Cleve presents (BT3) as a possible bundle-
theoretic rejoinder to objections 1-6, but he submits 
that it falls prey to an argument ad personam: "(a de-
fender of (BT3)] . . . would have to believe . . . that 
there is no such thing as himself."* I shall not dis-
cuss this here, for whatever the shortcomings of (BT3) 
are, the bundle-theorist need not resort to it as long 
as a more plausible alternative, such as guise theory, 
is still viable. 
Van Cleve's unease with guise theory results from 
his classifying it as a (BT2)-theory. He does so by 
subsuming under his co-instantiation Castaneda's con-
substantiation, as well as Russell's compresence and 
Goodman's togetherness. 1 0 
These four notions do present many similarities. 
Yet, they also differ in important respects, so that 
they cannot really be said to play the same role. 1 1 In 
particular, while compresence, togetherness and co-
instantiation are alike in that they hold among proper-
ties, 1 2 Castaneda's consubstantiation holds between en-
tities of a different kind, namely, guises, that belong 
in the category of concrete individuals. 
We should be grateful to Van Cleve for having in-
directly suggested a comparative study of the systems 
associated with these notions, a study that would cer-
tainly be fascinating. Time and space does not allow 
me to do it here. I shall limit myself to a descrip-
tion of those features of guise theory which are 
relevant to the present discussion. This will allow us 
to see clearly why guise theory is a version of the 
bundle theory that survives objections 4-6 in perfectly 
good health. 
Ill 
The fundamental datum on which guise theory is bas-
ed is that ordinary physical objects such as tables and 
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chairs are too complex to be experienced by us in their 
entirety. We can only experience guises or aspects of 
them. For example, when one says veridically that 
she/he sees a table, he/she is only seeing a side of 
the table and not the whole of it. To the extent that 
we regard the experience of a guise as an experience of 
a physical ordinary object, we should regard the guise 
as a concrete object and in that respect the guise must 
be distinguished from a mere set of properties. 
In fact there is a qualitative difference between 
the experience of a set of properties and that of a 
concrete individual. If I am looking at the same time 
at a rose and at an alligator, we can correctly say, 
with Van Cleve, that in no sense I am seeing a pink al-
ligator, although, in some sense, the set being pink, 
being an alligator can be said to be in my visual 
field. 
We must then admit that the "presence" of a set of 
properties within the content of an experience is not 
enough to experience a concrete individual. We can 
suppose however that a set of properties can be "en-
riched" by a concretizing factor, i.e., by what ac-
counts for the concrete individuality of an individual 
as distinct from the abstractness of a set. We can 
call such a factor the concretizer or individuator. 
The concretizer can be formally described as an opera-
tor that takes sets of monadic properties as argu-
ments. 1 1 
Accordingly, if "c" expresses the concretizer and 
Fj,. . .,F^ are monadic properties, a guise can be said 
to be of the form cQjT£,. . . ,F , 3 , where the set { F 1 # . . 
. , F r 3 is called the core of c{jfa,. . • , F n 3 • I f c l s 
worth adding that since guises can be taken to be the 
referents of English definite descriptions, the concon-
cretizer can be said to be what is expressed by the 
English article "the" as it is used, e.g., in the ex-
pression "the Queen of England." 1* 
Note that the concretizer does not account for a 
concrete individual's being different from all other 
individuals. In fact I did not say that every concrete 
individual has its own distinct concretizer. If this 
were so, the notion of a concretizer would differ only 
verbally from that of a bare substrate in which proper-
ties inhere. Though the concretizer is an operator and 
not a property, it is a universal in the sense that it 
is shared by all individuals in roughly the same sense 
in which the property red is shared by all red objects. 
Thus, guises can be different from each other only in 
virtue of the properties that constitute their cores. 
In this sense, guises are typical bundle-theoretic en-
tities. 
As we saw already, guises can be considered aspects 
of ordinary physical objects. At that juncture, the 
dichotomy bundle view vs. substrate view proposes it-
self again in the form of two possible options. The 
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first consists of taking guises to be (partial) re-
presentations of particulars lying mysteriously beyond 
our reach. The second consists of taking ordinary 
physical objects to be merely structures or clusters of 
guises related to each other by the relation of consub-
stantiation. CastafTeda emphatically chooses the second 
option a*nd accordingly calls guise theory a "bundle-
bundle theory."" 
Consubstantiation is the contingent identity ex-
pressed by the English "is" in expressions such as 
(1) the morning star is the evening star 
(2) this piece of marble is Michelangelo's most beauti-
ful statue 
(3) every drop of water is a drop of H20. 
We must then hold fast to the idea that consubstan-
tiation is a relation that (i) holds between entities 
that can be categorized as concrete individuals, namely 
guises, and (ii) allows the "construction" of ordinary 
physical objects insofar as the latter are regarded as 
structures constituted by mutually consubstantiated 
guises. (These structures are characterized by certain 
important formal properties; as regards this the reader 
should consult the relevant works in the bibliography). 
IV 
We are now ready to tackle Van Cleve's objections 
one by one. 
Reply to objection 4. 
Since Van Cleve understands co-instantiation as a 
relation that contingently keeps together in a complex 
different properties at different times, he admits that 
in the bundle theorist world, there can be plenty 
of change of one sort, namely change in the rela-
tional characteristics of properties. 1 4 
Nevertheless, he laments that 
If F and G are co-instantiated first with H and 
later with K, so that the complex FGH is super-
seded by the complex FGK, what we have is re-
placement of one individual by another, not 
change in the properties of one and the same in-
dividual. FGH is simply not identical with 
FGK. 1 7 
Van Cleve is here implicitly acknowledging two im-
portant data: (i) a change presupposes a self-same 
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subject of change and a notion of predication that al-
lows us to say that such a subject is, say, H at time t 
and K at time t'. (ii) Not only properties, but con-
crete individuals can change. For example, we say that 
the morning star appears in the sky in the morning; it 
then disappears and reappears again at night. 
Van Cleve is right in thinking that with his com-
plexes and his co-instantiation, he does not have e-
nough "tools, 1 1 so to speak, to account for the data. 
Guise theory on the other hand can account for these 
data since guises are the required concrete individuals 
that remain self-identical through change, and consub-
stantiation is the form of predication that allows us 
to make sense of their changing. 
Let us note first that, according to guise theory, 
the contingent attribution to a guise g of a property P 
(that possibly does not belong in its core) is nothing 
more than the claim that g is consubstantiated with the 
guise g' whose core is the core of g union P. In other 
words, 
(4) The Queen of England is happy 
is to be parsed roughly as 
(5) C*(c £being Queen of England3 , c^being Queen of 
England, being happy3) (where "C*" symbolizes the 
notion of consubstantiation.) 
Now suppose that (5) is true at time t and that at 
times t' the Queen of England becomes unhappy. The 
truth of (5) is then superseded by the truth of 
(6) C*(c ibeing Queen of England} , c(being Queen of 
England, being unhappy}). 
Consequently, the cluster of consubstantiated 
guises comprising c(being Queen of England, being hap-
Py3 i s superseded by one that comprises c(being queen 
of England, being unhappy3 instead. 1* But obviously 
the concrete guise c(being queen of England^ has re-
mained self-identical through this change. 
This account heavily relies on the fact that guise 
theory is a bundle-bundle theory rather than simply a 
bundle theory. But the fact that guise theory is 
bundle-theoretic twice over is overlooked if one as-
sumes that consubstantiation (like Van Cleve's co-
instantiation) is a relation that holds between proper-
ties, rather than between guises. It is an important 
point, though, because, although consubstantiational 
clusters can be "superseded" in much the same way in 
which Van Cleve's complexes can, this in no way hinges 
on recognizing in the guises the concrete unities of 
our experience that remain self-identical through the 
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change induced by the contingent character of consub-
stantiation. 
Reply to objection 5. 
Here is how Van Cleve argues for the thesis that 
(BT2) is committed to deny that concrete objects can 
have contingent properties: 
It will not be true of any individual that it 
might have existed with properties other than the 
ones it actually has: we cannot suppose that a 
complex whose constituents are F, G, and H might 
have existed with F, G, and K as its constituents 
instead. 1 0 
Patently, Van Cleve is implicitly acknowledging as 
a datum the fact that we can speak of a concrete indiv-
idual as if we can re-identify it in a counterfactual 
situation in which it has, say, the property K rather 
than the property H that it in fact has. For example, 
we say that the morning star might not have had the 
property of appearing in the evening. Once more, t h i 3 
presupposes self-same subjects of re-identification and 
a notion of predication that allows us to attribute to 
them different properties under different (counter) 
factual conditions (or in different possible worlds, if 
you wish.) 
Again, guises are such subjects and consubstantia-
tion is such a notion of predication, whereas Van 
Cleve's complexes and co-instantiation cannot play 
these respective roles. Given the contingent character 
of consubstantiation, it is perfectly correct to say 
that a concrete individual such as the morning star 
might not have been consubstantiated with what it is in 
fact consubstantiated, e.g., the evening star. As it 
should be clear from the foregoing discussion, this is 
the same as saying, from the point of view of guise 
theory, that the morning star might not have had the 
property of appearing in the evening. 1 0 
The contingent character of consubstantiation is 
also revealed by the fact that the guises that are in 
fact consubstantiated might have failed to be such, 
i.e., might have failed to exist. 2 1 This is also a 
possibility for Van Cleve's complexes, 2 2 but, as we 
have seen, other options as well are open for 
Castaneda's guises. 
Reply to objection 6. 
In launching his objection 6, Van Cleve is well 
aware, of course, that it suffices to count self-
identity (which he calls an "impure property") as a 
property to make the denial of PII absurd. He thinks, 
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however, that such a move is not open to the bundle 
theorist: 
Impure properties, is such there be, are ontolog-
ically derivative from individuals; individuals, 
if the bundle theory is true, are ontologically 
derivative from properties. One cannot have it 
both ways. Hence, the bundle theory cannot admit 
impure properties. 2 2 
Van Cleve's conclusion does not follow, for his 
last premise should be rejected. Indeed, one must 
"have it both ways." Truly, the bundle theorist is 
committed to the ontological dependency of concrete in-
dividuals on the properties that constitute them as 
bundles of properties. But impure properties, i.e. (if 
I understand Van Cleve's use of "impure") properties 
other than the ones that constitute the bundle, must 
"emerge," once a bundle is constituted. 
This is obvious if one just considers that self-
identity must be a property that is true of any given 
object independently and over and above whatever prop-
erties have contributed to its being that given object. 
Van Cleve's contrast of impure vs. pure properties im-
plicitly hints at such a datum. 
Guise theory acknowledges it and accordingly dis-
tinguishes between internal and external forms of pred-
ication. The former 2* allows us to predicate of any 
given guise the properties that contribute to its 
constitution, as when we say, with Meinong, that even 
the round square is, in some sense, round. The latter 
allows us to predicate of any given guise, whatever 
properties can or must accrue to it, once the guise is 
constituted. Self-identity is but one case of a prop-
erty that can be predicated externally." Consubstan-
tiation is but another form of external predication in 
that, as we saw, it provides a means to predicate of 
guises properties that do not belong in their core." 
The possibility of external predication makes guise 
theory a hierarchical ontology that has its foundations 
on a level of basic properties and operators 2 7 on which 
successive stages of guises and properties rest, with 
each stage ontologically dependent on the preceding 
one. In fact, according to guise theory, from external 
predications one can obtain properties that can, in 
turn, contribute to the formation of new guises. For 
example, we can have "internal" self-identity and "in-
ternal" consubstantiational properties. 2' (Therefore, 
a guise such as c £being a morning star, being self-
identical, being consubstantiated with the evening 
star]} is a legitimate guise, which is distinct from, 
and yet contingently the same as, c fjbeing a morning 
starj). 
This sharply distinguishes guise theory from what 
might be called the "flat" version of the bundle theory 
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that Van Cleve seems to have in mind, a version in 
which no new property can be "ontologically posterior" 
to the constitution of bundles. 
V 
Van Cleve's stand against the bundle theory is 
based on data that must undoubtedly be taken into ac-
count. This demonstrates his keen philosophical sense. 
Guise theory, however, provides a bundle-theoretic ac-
count of such data. It thereby avoids the postualtion 
of unknowable substrates whose mysteriousness many 
philosophers, e.g. Hume and Russell, 2 9 have lamented. 1 0 
NOTES 
*Van Cleve, "Three Versions of the Bundle Theory," 
Philosophical Studies 47, 1985, pp. 95-107. Guise 
Theory is expounded in Castaneda 1974, 1975a, 1977. A 
quick but sufficiently detailed introduction to it is 
provided by Plantinga 1983, part I. 
2The labels "(BT1)," "(BT2)," and "(BT3)" are mine. 
'Van Cleve 1985, p. 95. 
*Van Cleve 1985, p. 97. 
'Van Cleve 1985, p. 98. 
'Van Cleve 1985, p. 103. 
'See Van Cleve 1985, p. 95. 
•Van Cleve 1985, p. 96. 
'Van Cleve 1985, p. 105. 
1 0Van Cleve 1985, p. 97. 
''Contra Van Cleve 1985, note 7, p. 106. 
"Although we should perhaps more properly speak, 
in the case of Russell and Goodman, of phenomenal 
qualia (cf. Russell 1948, p. 294, and Goodman 1977, p. 
144, respectively.) 
1'Castaneda's discusses the concretizer in Cas-
taneda 1975, and 1974, pp. 4-5 and 12-17. 
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"Contra Van Cleve we should thus say that the con-
cretizer and not consubstantiation (to be described 
below) is guise theory's answer to (BTl)'s main pro-
blem, namely that concrete individuals are not mere 
sets of properties. However in fairness to Van Cleve 
it must be said that the notion of consubstantiation 
allows us to distinguish between mere sets of guises 
and sets of guises whose members are all aspects of one 
physical object. 
"Castaneda 1974, p. 24, and 1977, p. 322. 
"Van Cleve 1985, p. 98. 
"Van Cleve 1985, p. 98. 
"Castaneda 1974, p. 24. 
"If, at time t', the cluster of guises C, compris-
ing the guise g, is "superseded" by the cluster C' that 
comprises the guise g' instead of the guise g, then, 
certainly, C' is distinct from C. Nevertheless, C and 
C' can be said to be related by a relation akin to i-
dentity, but weaker than it, i.e., transubstantiation 
(cf. Castaneda 1974, p. 26). Castafleda has never 
worked out in detail the laws governing transubstantia-
tion. Unfortunately, to do it here would take us too 
far afield. 
"Van Cleve 1985, p. 99. 
"Note, however, that Castaneda did never explic-
itly consider a guise-theoretical treatment of modali-
ties (such as the possibility expressed by the English 
"might" in "the morning star might not have had the 
property of appearing in the morning"). Nevertheless, 
we can speculate that two distinct consubstantiational 
clusters belonging to two different possible worlds can 
be realted by something analogous to transubstantia-
tion, provided the two clusters have certain guises in 
common (which guises might depend on the context and on 
assumed standards). We might call such a relation 
countersubstantiation (since it can be used for a 
guise-theoretical account of counterfactuals) or simply 
transubstantiation with respect to possible worlds. To 
expand on this here would take me beyond my present 
concern. 
2 1For the relation between consubstantiation and 
existence see Castaneda 1974, p. 13 and p. 15, and 
1977, p. 323. 
2 1Van Cleve, 1985, p. 99. 
"Van Cleve 1985, p. 96. 
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"That is, Meinongian predication (cf. Castaneda, 
1974, p. 11). 
"Castaneda 1974, p. 12. Castaneda's contrasting 
therein the notion of property and the notion of enter-
ing a fact, corresponds, I take it, to Van Cleve's con-
trast of pure and impure properties. 
a Tconflatlon and consociation are other forms of 
external predication (cf. Castaneda 1974, pp. 17-20). 
"Such as the concretizer and the set forming oper-
ator. 
" A s it can be seen from Castaneda's analysis of 
the Meinong-Russell debate (cf. Castaneda 1974, p. 21). 
"See, e.g., Hume 1975 Book I, part I, sect. VI, 
pp. 15-17, and Russell 1948, p. 294. 
" I am grateful to Professor Hector-Neri Castaneda 
and to an anonymous referee for helpful comments on 
previous drafts of this paper. I also wish to thank 
Karin Usadi for some stylistical suggestions. 
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